Abstract
Introduction 24
The Working Group III report from the IPCC 5 th assessment on climate mitigation (Edenhofer 25 et al., 2014) was received with dissonant responses by climate experts and policy analysts 26 when it was released in April 2014 (Schiermeier, 2014; Tol, 2014) . Although some plainly 27 stated that the analysis is already there, we only need action (The Economist, 2014), there 28 were several critical comments pointing out that the report lacked specific guidance on how 29 countries could lower their emissions. 30
Some countries are well prepared for a reorientation of their energy policy, with 31 technological, economic and institutional capacity to transform. Other countries face the 32 challenge to develop the economy and reduce poverty at the same time as a fossil energy 33 system needs to be phased out. As argued in the post Working Group III debate (Schiermeier, 34 2014; Tol, 2014) , several policy issues need to be solved together with the climate problem. 35
In this context it was argued that technological progress and poverty reduction might prove to 36 be more efficient in reducing emissions than an international treaty like the Kyoto Protocol. 37
A ranking of major factors contributing to historic avoided emissions was presented by The 38 Economist (2014) as a guide to the actions that have done the most to slow global warming. 39
The Montreal protocol from 1987 stands out above all policies as the climate mitigator no 1. 40
Well behind follows growth in nuclear and hydro power production, and then comes the one 41 child policy of China. Although merely an illustration, this ranking highlights the relevance of 42 taking factors outside the sphere of dedicated climate policy into account, particularly for 43 developing countries, where the society is in rapid transition along many dimensions. A major 44 issue is therefore to explore the relationship between policy for development and policy for 45 climate mitigation in emerging economies where poverty is still a challenge. Poverty 46 reduction is a stated aim of both poor and rich countries, and the possibility that climate 47 Section 4 reports the impacts on the economy and energy use whereas Section 5 assesses the 122 climate effect of stabilizing CO2 emissions at 2015 level towards 2030. The last section 123 concludes the paper. 124
Scenarios 125
We develop a baseline or business as usual (BAU) scenario as our starting point and introduce 126 two policy scenarios. One policy scenario (SN1) stabilizes CO2 emissions at 2015 level 127 onwards by means of an endogenous CO2 tax on fossil fuels use. The other policy scenario 128 (SN2) considers the effect of a similar reduction of CO2 emissions achieved through a CO2 129 tax on fossil fuel combustion but in this case, the tax revenue is recycled to rural households 130 to reduce poverty and the urban-rural income gap. 131 SN1: Tax on CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. The CO2 tax is introduced as the only policy 132 measure. Total government revenue and associated expenditure is assumed to be a fixed share 133 of GDP. The economy is only affected by the changes in relative prices following the CO2 134 tax, in turn influencing energy use, level of economic activity and the income distribution. 135
The CO2 tax is endogenous and adjusts to stabilize CO2 emissions at 2015 level onwards. To 136 keep the CO2 emissions constant, the tax increases from USD 0.4 per ton CO2 in 2016 to USD 137 57.3 per ton CO2 in 2030. So far a CO2 tax is not formally introduced in China. However, the 138 government regulates the fuel prices and can mimic a CO2 tax in line with emission 139 characteristics of coal, oil and gas. 140 A CO2 tax is appropriate from an environmental point of view, considering the hazardous 141 effect of CO2 on global and regional climate (IPCC, 2014) and the serious air pollution linked 142 to combustion of fossil fuels and in particular to coal. Recent research indicates that air 143 pollution reduced life expectancy by 5.5 years in Northern China owing to coal based winter 144 heating, increasing the incidence of cardiorespiratory illnesses (Chen et al., 2013) .
Acknowledging the large health damage by coal, China is now pursuing a policy for 146 substantial constraints on coal use for electricity production. generally facing similar but somewhat less strict regulations than the Eastern provinces. The 161 logical consequence of these regulation would be a phase out of coal for power production 162 and a switch to gas powered and renewable energy sources. Details on implementation will be 163 decided on in the further elaboration of the 13th Five Year Plan 2016-2020. 164
In our study the tax is imposed on all fossil fuel use and coal is expected to be hit the hardest. 165
The distributional effects are expected to reduce the urban-rural poverty gap. A tax on oil 166 consumption will affect the better-off segments of urban households with a living standard 167 based on high indirect coal use through fossil based electricity and heat consumption. In our 168
context it makes sense that a CO2 tax shields the poorer rural households who use biomass for 169 heating and cooking (Zhang et al., 2014 ) and the work migrants in the cities with a very lowconsumption of fossil energy . However, indirectly the whole economy will 171 be somewhat affected through a higher cost level, and the rural economy might be affected 172 through increasing costs of transportation and inputs like energy intensive fertilizer. 173 SN2: CO2 tax in combination with income redistribution: In SN2 the CO2 tax revenue is used 174 for active redistribution of income between the urban and rural population. The Government 175 recycles the CO2 tax revenue as a subsidy to rural households, increasing their income and 176 capacity to consume. These economic transfers may also contain public services in kind, like 177 health care, education and pensions. For technical reasons we implement the transfers to rural 178 households as a subsidy on farmland. The land subsidy represents transfers that neither 179 disturb farmers' incentives for crop production nor consumer demand. Further, it acts as a 180 neutral transfer also with respect to farmland, which is fixed for a single farmer in China and 181 limited on a national scale for resource reasons. A relevant question is if the poorest really 182 will benefit from the additional land subsidy. In China, land is state owned and allocated to 183 farmers according to the family size and land productivity. Hence, Chinese agriculture is 184 based on family farms, and even the poorest have access to land. If land area is the basis for 185 the subsidy, the poor will benefit with the same absolute benefit per unit, but higher in 186 proportion to their income level than the better off. If poor families farm less productive soil, 187 but have larger area per capita, the land subsidy might even favor the poorest families. 188
Further, the low consumption of transportation and manufactured goods of the poor 189 households makes them less exposed to the CO2 tax on fossil fuels than better off households. 
Data and methods 212
We have adopted an integrated assessment approach in this study. An economic model was 213 used to simulate the impact of targeted policies on the economy and on particle and gas 214 emissions associated with economic activities. The emissions data serve as inputs for a 215 chemistry transport model, and to climate response metrics, to estimate atmospheric 216 concentrations, radiative forcing, and impact on the global mean temperature of the targeted 217 policies. Emissions were distributed according to the fraction of total emission in each grid cell in 253 RCP2.6. 254
Climate impact assessment 255
The global-mean temperature response over time is quantified for each pollutant and scenario 256 using the Absolute Global Temperature change Potential (AGTP) (Shine et al., 2005) . The 257 AGTP for pollutant x is given by the radiative forcing (RF) and the temperature response 258 impulse response function (IRFT) at the time horizon H: 259
Hence, the AGTP takes into account both the time evolution of the perturbations to the 261 climate system (and the resulting radiative forcing), and the response of the climate itself. 262
We use the IRFT based on the Hadley CM3 climate model (Boucher and Reddy, 2008) . The 263 equilibrium climate sensitivity is 1.06 °C/(W/m 2 ), i.e., a 3.9 °C global-mean temperature 264 increase for a doubling of CO2, which is in the upper end of the likely range of 1.5-4.5 °C 265 reported by the IPCC (Bindoff et al., 2013) . 266
The temperature response (∆T) for pollutant x given an emission scenario Ex has been 267 calculated with a convolution: 268
The uncertainties in the estimated temperature response were estimated by creating 100 270 member ensembles of the BAU and SN1 emission scenarios. For each ensemble member, the 271 RF of each short-lived climate forcers was randomly selected within its estimated uncertainty, 272 with a Gaussian probability distribution. The resulting spread in global mean temperature 273 change was subsequently calculated using common radiative forcing metric values (for details 274 on this methodology, see Fuglestvedt et al., 2014) . For the aerosols, relative standard 275 deviations of 39%, 33% and 34% were assumed for BC, OC and SO4 (sulfate) respectively 276 (Boucher et al., 2013) . For the greenhouse gases, a 6% uncertainty was assumed (Myhre et al., 277 2013) . No uncertainty was added for the climate sensitivity. 278
The RF input to Eq. 1 is derived using two different approaches depending on the lifetime of 279 the respective pollutant and is described in the two following sections. However, the impacts on the economy are highly sensitive to whether the CO2 tax is 345 accompanied by income redistribution (SN2) or not (SN1). For both scenarios the CO2 tax 346 rate is low initially, but increases steadily to keep the CO2 emissions constant at 2015 level. 347
Hence, the effects on the economy are also small initially but rising over time. As the CO2 tax 348 is rising, the domestic cost level is increasing, exposing China to higher competition in the 349 world market. Overall, the Chinese economy will see some profitable options for trade 350 foregone and suffer loss in income. However, structural changes in production and 351 consumption in the wake of the income redistribution might modify this loss. by 4 per cent. In China's family farming system labour is the main input as land is contracted 364 from the government at a low rate. Hence, the value added contribution from agriculture to 365 GDP is larger for a given increase in output value than in most other production sectors. 366
Further, agriculture is particularly stimulated by the increase in rural income as the income 367 level is low at the outset and food makes up a considerable share of their demand. The CO2 368 tax revenue and thus the land subsidy gradually rises to 6.6 per cent of GDP in 2030. The shift of expenditure from an urban to a rural consumption pattern requires more resources 383 for domestic production, crowding out some more exports on top of the domestic cost effect. 384
Imports increase by 1.7 per cent, accompanying a similar upwards shift in GDP. The economy 385 has become considerably less dependent on the world market in the SN2 scenario in line with 386 stated policy preferences. 387
Income distribution 388
The effect on household income in rural and urban China is shown in Figure 1c 
Energy markets 411
In both policy scenarios, the CO2 tax has a marked effect on the energy prices. The CO2 tax 412 increases over time to suppress the demand for fossil fuels and particularly coal. Coal is the 413 dominant feedstock for electricity production and the electricity price increases by around 65 414 per cent by 2030. Total consumption of electricity in SN1 and SN2 is lowered by 13-14 per 415 cent compared with the BAU in 2030, but will still be over 60 per cent above the base year 416 level. The reduced demand for electricity spills over into a similar reduction in demand for 417 coal, which in 2030 is sold at a price nearly one third lower than in BAU. 418
Purchaser prices on electricity increase markedly and so does the gas price, increasing by 419 about 50 per cent as a demand shift from coal is encouraged by the CO2 tax hitting coal 420 hardest. The prospects of an increasingly global market for natural gas/liquefied natural gas 421 (LNG) might however ease the upward pressure on the gas price, a factor that is not reflected 422 in this study. The strong increase in the gas price reflects the combination of limited national 423 resources and so far limited access to imports that can compete in price with heavily taxed 424 coal and relatively costly nuclear and new renewables. The future cost of renewables are 425 likely to be overestimated, hence the transition to low-carbon energy might impose less 426 increase in electricity and gas prices than our results indicate. 427
The cost of energy intensive iron and steel production is increasing by 8-9 per cent. A decline 428 in export of iron and steel of around 30 per cent contributes substantially to the decline in total 429 export volume at 5.8 per cent. Both policy scenarios come out quite similarly with respect to 430 impact on energy prices. Hence, the energy market is mainly affected by the CO2 tax and less 431 by the change in demand structure and industrial mix in the wake of the income redistribution. dominates, an effect that lasts beyond 2100 as avoided CO2 emissions would benefit the 479 climate for centuries. 480
The corresponding picture from ROW is shown in Figure 4b . We see that NOx emissions has 481 a more marked effect on the climate development in ROW than in China, initially warming 482 but switching to a modest cooling effect around 2040. The cooling effect of SO2 emissions in 483 ROW is larger relative to CO2-induced warming than for China. One reason is that sulfur 484 content of Chinese coal is relatively low. Since the uncertainty in the impact of SO2 and other pollutants with short-lived effect is much 502 larger than for the impact from CO2, the uncertainty is largest for the first decades. The initial 503 warming due to mainly reduced SO2 emissions is therefore highly uncertain, while the long 504 term cooling is more certain. Although the change in ROW CO2 emissions is small, total 505 ROW emissions are larger than China's and the uncertainty of the estimated long term 506 warming by ROW emission increase is higher than for Chinese emission reduction and 507 cooling. The overall uncertainty in our best estimate is in the same order as the estimated 508 cooling, but is gradually reduced towards 0.02 degrees at the end of the century. This policy is feasible but implementation depends on political will and capacity to overcome 527 barriers, for instance represented by political strongholds like coal based and energy intensive 528 state owned industries. Fortunately, two aspects rank the reform policy high on the to-do list, 529 namely the challenge to social stability from large income differences and further, the deep 530 discontent among urban citizens with the serious air pollution. Combined climate policy and 531 socioeconomic reform will address both the rural and the urban issue. Hence, critical domestic 532 policy issues involving the population at large might be resolved through climate mitigation 533 efforts. For the COP21 meeting in Paris China has pledged to cap CO2 emissions by 2030 at 534 the latest. Our study shows that Chinese emissions might well be stabilized earlier. 535
